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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RELIGIOUS FREEDOM-FORCED DIs-
CLOSURE OF CHURCH RECORDS PURSUANT TO STATE NON-PROFIT
CORPORATION STATUTE PROHIBITED. Gipson v. Brown, 288 Ark.
422, 706 S.W.2d 369 (1986); Gipson v. Brown, 295 Ark. 371, 749
S.W.2d 297 (1988); Gipson v. Munson, 296 Ark. 160, 752 S.W.2d 752
(1988).
Individual members of the Sixth and Izard Church of Christ in
Little Rock brought suit against church elders,' asserting the right to
examine church records pursuant to Arkansas' Non-Profit Corpora-
tion Act2 and requesting a court-ordered election of the church Board
of Directors. 3 The elders refused to comply, arguing that church doc-
trine prohibited disclosure. The chancery court,4 however, ordered
compliance with a discovery request for the records. The elders ap-
pealed this interlocutory order to the Arkansas Supreme Court, con-
tending that such compliance would effect a decision on the merits of
the case. The Arkansas Supreme Court remanded for a full eviden-
tiary hearing "on the claim of first amendment protection versus the
disclosure requirements of corporations."5 Gipson v. Brown, 288 Ark.
422, 706 S.W.2d 369 (1986) [hereinafter Gipson I].
On remand, the chancellor appointed a special master to hear
evidence and decide the first amendment question as required by the
Gipson I decision. The chancery court subsequently adopted the
master's recommendations that the elders conduct an election and
1. Each Church of Christ congregation is independent and autonomous, and is governed
by a group of elders whose authority to manage church affairs is based on their understanding
of certain New Testament teachings on church leadership. Defendant's Responses to Requests
for Admissions, Gipson v. Brown, 288 Ark. 422, 706 S.W.2d 369 (1986) (No. 85-180).
2. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-28-218 (1987) states in pertinent part: "Each corporation shall
keep correct and complete books and records of account .... All books and records of a
corporation may be inspected by any member for any proper purpose at any reasonable time."
3. The church elders also served as the Board of Directors of the corporation. Plaintiffs
desired divulgence of compensation paid to employees, sources of church income, long dis-
tance telephone charges, and ballots of the last election of church elders/Board of Directors.
Complaint, Gipson v. Brown, 288 Ark. 422, 706 S.W.2d 369 (1986) (No. 85-180).
4. First Division, Pulaski County, Lee A. Munson, Jr.
5. Gipson v. Brown, 288 Ark. at 429, 706 S.W.2d at 373 [hereinafter Gipson I].
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make the church records available for inspection. The elders again
appealed. The Arkansas Supreme Court held that referring the case
to a master had been unwarranted and reviewed the case de novo.
The court ruled that the dispute between the church members and the
elders was essentially religious in nature, and thus its resolution by a
civil court was improper. Furthermore, the lack of any evidence of a
compelling state interest precluded, as an unconstitutional interfer-
ence with free exercise of religion, the application of the Arkansas
Non-Profit Corporation Act.6 The court dismissed the appeal. Gip-
son v. Brown, 295 Ark. 371, 749 S.W.2d 297 (1988) [hereinafter Gip-
son II].
When no records were produced, plaintiffs initiated contempt
proceedings against the elders, alleging that because the appeal had
been dismissed in Gipson II the order of the chancellor was still in
effect. The elders petitioned for writ of prohibition, seeking a perma-
nent stay of contempt proceedings. The supreme court, in a short per
curiam opinion, stated that the mandate issued pursuant to Gipson II
specifically dismissed the chancery decree. Reiterating that the case
turned on an impermissible resolution of an intrachurch dispute, the
court disposed of the matter by granting the permanent stay requested
by the church elders. Gipson v. Munson, 296 Ark. 160, 752 S.W.2d
752 (1988) [hereinafter Gipson III].
The Gipson cases present two first amendment7 questions. First,
may a court constitutionally interfere with a religious dispute? Sec-
ond, may a church refuse to obey civil law when that law conflicts
with church doctrine? An analysis of the Arkansas Supreme Court's
handling of Gipson therefore requires an examination of judicial treat-
ment of both issues.
I.
A dispute between members of a religious association which finds
its way into the civil courts is generally characterized as an entangle-
ment issue, presenting the question of whether judicial resolution of
the dispute is within the authority of the court or whether such an
action is proscribed by the constitution. This entanglement problem
is one which is not easily categorized in a first amendment context, for
the issues it presents are subject to scrutiny under both the establish-
6. Gipson v. Brown, 295 Ark. 371, 749 S.W.2d 297 (1988) [hereinafter Gipson 11].
7. The relevant section of the first amendment states: "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
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ment clause and the free exercise clause.' When judicial involvement
in a religious dispute interferes with the church's right to resolve its
own internal affairs, it violates the constitutional prohibition on gov-
ernment interference with the free exercise of religion.9 However, the
establishment clause is implicated when an intrachurch dispute based
on religious doctrine is presented to a court for resolution. A judg-
ment for either side in the litigation gives state sanction to religious
beliefs and in effect "establishes" the doctrinal views propounded by
the party receiving the benefit of the court's ruling.'°
The United States Supreme Court first examined the manner in
which a civil tribunal should hear a case involving an intrachurch
dispute in Watson v. Jones." Watson involved a disagreement among
members of the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church in Louisville,
Kentucky, over control of church property. During the Civil War the
congregation split into antislavery and proslavery factions, with the
latter breaking with the church hierarchy and joining the Presbyterian
Church of the Confederate States.' 2 Determining which group repre-
sented the "true" congregation was central to the question of which
faction was entitled to possession of church property.' 3 In ruling for
the antislavery faction, the Supreme Court established what has be-
come known as the "deference principle" for judicial resolution of
intrachurch disputes.' 4
When confronted with an intrachurch dispute, the deference
principle requires a court to accept the decision which has been ren-
dered by the established authority of the church in question. In Wat-
son the ruling body of the denomination with which the Walnut Street
Church was originally affiliated had declared that the antislavery fac-
tion represented the church's true congregation and therefore was en-
titled to ownership of the church property.' 5 The Supreme Court
deferred to this determination, reasoning that the church hierarchy
was better equipped to arrive at the correct conclusion than a civil
court unfamiliar with ecclesiastical law.' 6
8. See infra text accompanying notes 27-37.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 27-32.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 33-37.
11. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
12. Id. at 695-96.
13. Id. at 717.
14. Id. at 727.
15. Id. at 734. The ruling authority of the Walnut Street Church was the General Assem-
bly of the Central Presbyterian Church of the United States. Id. at 695.
16. Id. at 729. In ascertaining where church authority lay, the Watson opinion distin-
guished congregational churches from hierarchical churches. A congregational church is au-
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A reliance on "the ordinary principles which govern voluntary
associations"' 7 was critical to the Watson Court's formulation of the
deference principle. One who chooses to associate with a religious
organization does so with implicit acquiesence to the polity'8 and
practices of that church. "All who unite themselves to such a body
do so with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to
submit to it."' 9 Those who later question decisions made by the rec-
ognized authority of the church therefore cannot appeal to the civil
courts for redress of their grievances.2 °
Almost sixty years after Watson the deference principle was
modified somewhat in Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Ma-
nila.2' After citing Watson 22 as authority for affirming the right of
the Catholic hierarchy to determine qualifications for the priesthood
without civil court direction,23 the Court said that decisions of proper
church authorities are to be accepted in secular courts "[i]n the ab-
sence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness. '24
Both Watson and Gonzalez were pre-Erie 25 cases decided on fed-
eral common law grounds rather than first amendment principles.26
The rationale of the deference principle was first given constitutional
underpinnings in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral.27  Kedroff chal-
lenged a New York statute which attempted to transfer administrative
tonomous, "governed solely within itself, either by a majority of its members or by such other
local organism as it may have instituted for the purpose of ecclesiastical government." Id. at
724. A hierarchical church, such as the Presbyterian church in Watson, is "itself part of a
large and general organization of some religious denomination, with which it is more or less
intimately connected by religious views and ecclesiastical government." Id. at 726. Under
both forms of church government a decision as to ownership of church property made by the
recognized authority is not subject to review by a civil court. Id. at 725, 727.
17. Id. at 725.
18. Polity refers to "the particular system of church government upon which church
members have agreed, including the structural allocation of authority within the church and
the established grievance procedures for resolving internal disputes." Adams and Hanlon,
Jones v. Wolf Church Autonomy and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 128 U. PA.
L. REV. 1291, 1292 n.5 (1980).
19. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 729.
20. Id.
21. 280 U.S. 1 (1929) (modification resulted from dicta in opinion by Brandeis, J.).
22. Id. at 16.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Erie Ry. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (federal courts should apply relevant
state common law in diversity cases).
26. The religion clauses of the first amendment were applied to the states through the
fourteenth amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise) and
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (establishment).
27. 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
DISCLOSURE OF CHURCH RECORDS
control of the Russian Orthodox Church in that state from the tradi-
tional authority in Moscow to a governing body in the United
States.2" An ensuing property dispute hinged on which church organ-
ization had the right to appoint the head of the New York diocese.
The right had previously belonged to the central hierarchy in Mos-
cow, and the Court found nothing to indicate a relinquishment of that
right. 29 The Court relied on the deference principle enunciated in
Watson 30 and concluded that the New York statute unconstitution-
ally infringed on the church's right to select its clergy.3 Such a right,
the Court declared, "[M]ust now be said to have federal constitutional
protection as part of the free exercise of religion against state
interference. 3
2
Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue
Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church33 addressed the question of
whether an establishment clause violation is implicit in a secular court
resolution of a religious doctrinal dispute. The Georgia Supreme
Court had affirmed a jury finding that the general church had devi-
ated from established church doctrine. The local congregations
which had withdrawn from the hierarchy in protest were therefore
entitled to control of their church facilities.34 The Supreme Court re-
versed, 35 holding that a state-sanctioned determination of whether a
religious organization has departed from the teachings under which it
was founded "requires the civil court to determine matters at the very
core of a religion-the interpretation of particular church doctrines
and the importance of those doctrines to the religion. Plainly, the first
amendment forbids civil courts from playing such a role."'36 How-
ever, the Court questioned the utility of the deference principle as an
absolute means for avoiding court establishment of religious beliefs
and suggested an alternative method for resolving intrachurch dis-
putes based on "neutral principles of law."
37
28. Id. at 98.
29. Id. at 120.
30. "The [Watson] opinion radiates ... a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an
independence from secular control or manipulation-in short, power to decide for themselves,
free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doc-
trine." Id. at 116.
31. Id. at 119.
32. Id. at 116.
33. 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
34. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,
224 Ga. 61, 159 S.E.2d 690 (1968), rev'd, 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
35. 393 U.S. at 452.
36. Id. at 450.
37. The Court stated that:
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Hull Church thus provided authority for secular resolution of
church property disputes. If a court could base its decision on neutral
principles of law without delving into questions of church orthodoxy,
a ruling in favor of either party would not violate the first
amendment.38
The deference principle, however, was by no means dead. It was
reasserted by the Court in 1976 in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese
for the United States and Canada v. Milivojevich.39 The case involved
a decision by the church's highest governing body, the Holy Assem-
bly, to split the American-Canadian Diocese' and simultaneously
suspend a bishop.4' The Supreme Court of Illinois had applied "neu-
tral principles," looking to the written church constitution and affilia-
tion agreements, and ruled the Holy Assembly in violation thereof in
its decision to divide the diocese. The court had also found the re-
moval of the bishop arbitrary under Gonzalez.42 The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the Illinois court had embarked upon a forbid-
den inquiry into the polity of the Serbian Orthodox Church.43 Citing
Watson at length, the Court stated that judicial forays into the propri-
ety of internal church administration necessarily required an exami-
nation of church doctrine and could not be justified as a review of an
"arbitrary" church practice."
Civil courts do not inhibit the free exercise of religion merely by opening their doors
to disputes involving church property. And there are neutral principles of law, devel-
oped for use in all property disputes, which can be applied without "'establishing"
churches to which property is awarded.
Id. at 449 (emphasis added).
38. The Supreme Court upheld application of neutral principles a year later in Maryland
& Virginia Eldership of the Church of God v. Church of God, Inc., 396 U.S. 367 (1970) (per
curiam), affirming a lower court decision which had relied on state religious corporation stat-
utes and property law in rejecting a governing church body's claim to real estate of two dissi-
dent churches. Id. at 367-68. In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan voiced support of
either neutral principles or the deference approach so long as neither necessitated court inquiry
into religious doctrine or church law. Id. at 368-70 (Brennan, J., concurring).
39. 426 U.S. 696 (1976). For an analysis of the case, see Note, The Role of Civil Courts in
Church Disputes, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 904.
40. 426 U.S. at 703.
41. Id. at 703-04.
42. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States and Canada v. Milivojevich,
60 11. 2d 477, 328 N.E.2d 268 (1975).
43. 426 U.S. at 709.
44. The Court observed that:
[Ilt is the essence of religious faith that ecclesiastical decisions are reached and are to
be accepted as matters of faith whether or not rational or measurable by objective
criteria. Constitutional concepts of due process, involving secular notions of "funda-
mental fairness" or impermissible objectives, are therefore hardly relevant to such
matters of ecclesiastical cognizance.
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Justice Rehnquist dissented,45 decrying the majority's reversion
to the deference principle as a vehicle by which civil courts "can eas-
ily be converted into hand-maidens of arbitrary lawlessness." 46 Criti-
cizing the Court's reliance on Watson, Rehnquist pointed out that
neither Watson nor Gonzalez had been decided on constitutional prin-
ciples, and therefore neither was relevant to the issue presented by
Milivojevich.47 He argued that while the Supreme Court decisions
since Kedroff justifiably required civil courts to refrain from placing
their weight behind any particular religious doctrine or belief, nothing
in the record of the case at bar indicated that the Illinois court had
done so.48 The lower court's application of neutral principles was
therefore correct. Moreover, the majority's resurrection of Watson's
deference approach was not only unwarranted under prior decisions
of the Court, but was itself fraught with the potential for constitu-
tional violations under the establishment clause.49
Three years after Milivojevich, the Supreme Court, in a five-to-
four decision, addressed the dichotomy it had created for resolution of
intrachurch disputes. Jones v. Wolf 50 established a three-step analysis
which incorporated both the "neutral principles" and the "deference"
approaches. First, a court must determine if the dispute can be re-
solved without an inquiry into religious doctrine.5" If so, then the
court is free to settle the disagreement based on neutral principles of
law. Such a decision may be founded on a secular scrutiny of reli-
Id. at 714-15 (citation omitted).
45. Id. at 725 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 727.
47. Id. at 732-33. See supra text accompanying note 25.
48. Id. at 732-33.
49. Id. at 734. Justice Rehnquist cautioned that:
Such blind deference.., is counseled neither by logic nor by the First Amendment.
To make available the coercive powers of civil courts to rubber-stamp ecclesiastical
decisions of hierarchical religious associations, when such deference is not accorded
similar acts of secular voluntary associations, would, in avoiding the free exercise
problems petitioners envision, itself create far more serious problems under the Es-
tablishment Clause.
Id.
50. 443 U.S. 595 (1979) (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, Rehnquist, and Ste-
vens, J.J.).
51. Id. at 602 (citing Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) and Maryland and Virginia Elder-
ship of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367 (1970)).
Significantly, Wolf abandoned the necessity for a congregational/hierarchical distinction, stat-
ing that "all forms of religious organization and polity" were amenable to its approach. Id. at
603. On this point the four dissenters agreed: "[t]he proper rule of decision ... requires a
court to give effect in all cases to the decisions of the church government agreed upon by the
members before the dispute arose." Id. at 614 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J.,
Stewart and White, J.J.).
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gious documents such as church constitutions, corporate charters,
and deeds.12 However, if examination of such documents reveals the
necessity for religious interpretation, then civil courts must again de-
fer to the established church authority's resolution of the dispute.53
The Wolf majority believed that application of this approach
would "free civil courts completely from entanglement in questions of
religious doctrine, polity, and practice. ' ' 54 The decision has been the
subject of criticism, however, for it fails to resolve the problem of
where secular scrutiny of a church dispute ends and civil inquiry into
religious doctrinal matters begins. 5
All of the Supreme Court cases except Gonzalez56 involved a
property dispute. The great majority of reported cases from lower
courts also involve conflict among church factions over legal owner-
ship of property.57 Early cases were decided on state common law
grounds, under the general rule that courts could resolve intrachurch
disputes over property rights. 8 However, most courts felt free when
adjudicating property disputes to determine, as did the Georgia court
in Hull Church, whether a faction or member of the church had devi-
ated from the church's purported doctrine.59 State courts, however,
generally refrained from deciding cases where property rights were
not in controversy. 6°
52. Id. at 604.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 603.
55. See Adams and Hanlon, supra note 18, at 1322-23; Ellman, Driven from the Tribunal;
Judicial Resolution of Internal Church Disputes, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1380, 1400 (1981).
56. 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
57. For a discussion of civil courts' involvement in disputes of this type, see Note, Judicial
Intervention of Church Property, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1142 (1962), and Note, Judicial Property
Disputes-Some Constitutional Considerations, 74 YALE L.J. 1113 (1965).
58. See, e.g., Bomar v. Mt. Olive Missionary Baptist Church, 92 Cal. App. 618, 268 P. 665
(1928) (suit by trustees to compel reconveyance of church property was within court's jurisdic-
tion); Thomas v. Lewis, 224 Ky. 307, 6 S.W.2d 255 (1928) (court had jurisdiction over con-
flicting claim to church property); Geiss v. Trinity Lutheran Church Congregation, 119 Neb.
745, 230 N.W. 658 (1930) (controversy over title and possession of church building outside
jurisdiction of ecclesiastical authority).
59. See, e.g., Yanthis v. Kemp, 43 Ind. App. 203, 85 N.E. 976 (1908) (evidence that
church majority had deviated from standards of Christian morality sufficient to warrant court
award of church property to minority faction); In re Stuart's Estate, 184 Iowa 165, 168 N.W.
779 (1918) (evidence pertaining to the sacraments warranted award of property to faction
whose beliefs were consistent with grantor); Nagle v. Miller, 275 Pa. 157, 118 A. 670 (1922)
(local church had not departed from doctrine to a degree that necessitated division of church
property).
60. See, e.g., Lewis v. Voliva, 154 Il1. App. 48 (1910) (determination of church's rightful
minister); Carter v. Papineau, 222 Mass. 464, 111 N.E. 358 (1916) (dispute over explusion of
church member).
[Vol. 12:75
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Even after the Supreme Court decisions in Kedroff and Hull
Church, many jurisdictions continued to decide intrachurch property
disputes based on state precedent rather than constitutional princi-
ples. 61 Supreme Court decisions influenced some state courts, how-
ever, and a few began to reject as unconstitutional civil resolution of a
church dispute if it required a determination of the church's "true"
teachings.62 With the formulation of the neutral principles approach
in Hull Church and its subsequent affirmation in Wolf, lower courts
found authority for looking to church documents when possible to
resolve disputes.63 However, in cases turning on a question of church
doctrine or religious belief, the deference principle continued to be
applied, with courts ruling that in such a circumstance the adjudica-
tion of the dispute was beyond a civil court's jurisdiction under the
first amendment. 64
A recent case involving discord within an Hassidic Jewish sect is
factually similar to Gipson. In Congregation Beth Yitzhoc v.
Briskman 65 members of the temple brought an action under the fed-
eral RICO66 statute for an injunction, an accounting, damages, and
attorneys' fees. They alleged that the congregation's funds were being
misused and that those in control of the funds were operating without
authority. 67 Although questioning whether the case fell under the
61. See, e.g., Ogden Street Church of God in Christ v. Gospel Temple Church of God in
Christ, 522 P.2d 757 (Colo. App. 1974) (members of congregation allowed legal redress to
protect property right); Mills v. Yount, 393 S.W.2d 96 (Mo. App. 1965) (diversion from doc-
trine reviewable to determine property right).
62. See, e.g., Pfeifer v. Christian Science Comm. on Publications for Ill., 31 Ill. App. 3d
845, 334 N.E.2d 876 (1975); Nolynn Ass'n of Separate Baptists in Christ v. Oak Grove Sepa-
rate Baptist Church, 457 S.W.2d 633 (Ky. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 (1971).
63. See, e.g., Draskovich v. Pasalich, 151 Ind. App. 297, 280 N.E.2d 69, reh'g granted,
153 Ind. App. 30, 285 N.E.2d 830 (1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973) (examination of
church documents permissible to ascertain church organization and polity); Piletich v. Dere-
tich, 328 N.W.2d 696 (Minn. 1982) (language of deeds, terms of church charter, and general
rules of property law relied upon to resolve property dispute); Western Penn. Conference of
United Methodist Church v. Everson Evangelical Church of Am., 454 Pa. 434, 312 A.2d 35
(1973).
64. See, e.g., Crowder v. Southern Baptist Convention, 828 F.2d 718 (1lth Cir. 1987)
(resolution of dispute over parliamentary procedure at church convention not within court's
jurisdiction); Anderson v. Worldwide Church of God, 661 F. Supp. 1401 (D. Minn. 1987)
(plaintiffs could not maintain action for fraud to recoup contributions to church's effort to
prepare for millenium, when defendants showed that church ministers truly believed the world
was coming to an end); Nunn v. Black, 506 F. Supp. 444 (W.D. Va. 1981) (dissident members
expelled for speaking in tongues could not maintain action against church).
65. 566 F. Supp. 555 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
66. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68
(1982).
67. 566 F. Supp. at 556.
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RICO statute, the court declined to base its decision on that issue.6"
Instead, it held that the case was nonjusticiable because the dispute
over control of funds centered on a determination of who under
church law was the rightful leader of the congregation.69 Citing Wolf,
Milivojevich and Kedroff, the court determined that resolution of the
allegations of fraud required first and foremost a decision as to the
proper succession to the position of congregational leader. Such a
decision was deemed improper for a civil court.70
Prior to Gipson, Arkansas cases involving intrachurch disputes
were generally limited to disagreements over control of church prop-
erty, 7 ' and the basis for their resolution parallels that of the decisions
in other jurisdictions previously discussed. 72 Arkansas's leading case
on this issue, Sanders v. Baggerly,73 concerned a property dispute be-
tween factions of a Presbyterian church. Relying on the reasoning of
Watson v. Jones,74 the court stated the "well-established" rule that
civil courts have no jurisdiction over cases involving only questions of
church doctrine.75 Subsequent cases follow this same rationale, with
the Arkansas Supreme Court refusing to determine controversies re-
lating to "the calculation and disposition of the tithe, the form of
church government, the right of the pastor to 'disfellowship' a mem-
ber, '" 76 or the authority of a governing body to dismiss local minis-
68. Id. at 557-58.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 558. The court reasoned that:
Defendants contend that the Skolyer Rebbe exercises "complete, unquestioned and
final" authority over all aspects of the affairs of his Congregation .... Under this
view, defendants, who never accepted the new Skolyer Rebbe, were entitled to man-
age plaintiffs' affairs as they saw fit. This Court is not in a position to ascertain
whether defendants' understanding of the Skolyer Rebbe's prerogatives reflects appli-
cable religious law. It is therefore apparent that an issue of religious doctrine must
be decided before it can be determined whether the defendants' acts were wrongful.
Id.
71. See infra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
73. 96 Ark. 117, 131 S.W. 49 (1910).
74. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872).
75. 96 Ark. at 132, 131 S.W. at 55.
Civil courts will not assume jurisdiction of controversies purely over matters of
church doctrine or discipline, where no property rights are involved; that civil courts
will assume jurisdiction only of causes involving civil or property rights, and, in such
causes, when questions arise concerning matters of church doctrine or discipline
which have been decided by a church court vested with such jurisdiction by church
laws, the civil courts accept as final and conclusive the decisions of the ecclesiastical
court.
Id.
76. Elston v. Wilborn, 208 Ark. 377, 377-78, 186 S.W.2d 662, 663 (1945).
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ters. 7 However, the great majority of Arkansas cases involve a
dispute between factions of a church over which group is entitled to
ownership and control of church property.7 8
Based on reasoning implicit in Sanders, the Arkansas Supreme
Court in Holiman v. Dovers79 adopted the general rule that civil
courts have jurisdiction over disputes arising within a congregational
church because "[t]here is no recourse within the denomination. 8 0
The court has consistently adhered to the precept that since majority
rule governs a congregational church, if the majority adheres to
church doctrine, it is the true representative of that congregation. 8
As in most other jurisdictions, Arkansas allows court determination
of whether a particular faction in the dispute had departed from
church doctrine. Ascertainment of which faction represented the ma-
jority of the church is usually facilitated by a court-sanctioned vote by
the members of the church.
2
None of these Arkansas cases were decided on constitutional
principles, and only Sanders83 mentions any decisions of the United
States Supreme Court.8 ' The rulings in the Gipson case are the first in
Arkansas to address the constitutional implications of civil adjudica-
tion of an intrachurch dispute.
II.
While the nature of the controversy in Gipson compelled judicial
consideration of an intrachurch dispute, that issue was inextricably
intertwined with the problem posed by a conflict between civil law,
the Arkansas Non-Profit Corporation Act, 85 and religious doctrine
77. Kinder v. Webb, 239 Ark. 1101, 396 S.W.2d 823 (1965).
78. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
79. 236 Ark. 211, 212, 366 S.W.2d 197, 199 (1963).
80. Id. at 212, 366 S.W.2d at 199. Other jurisdictions also rely on this principle. See, e.g.,
Manning v. Yeager, 201 Ala. 559, 79 So. 19 (1918); Woodrum v. Burton, 88 W. Va. 322, 107
S.E.102 (1921).
81. Cases were decided on the premise that the majority rules unless it has so departed
from its original principles that church beliefs are discredited. Such a deviant majority is not
allowed to divert church property to support any doctrine or practice which the founding
church opposed. See, e.g., Williams v. Cupp, 268 Ark. 1015, 1017, 597 S.W.2d 855, 856
(1980); Ables v. Garner, 220 Ark. 211, 214, 246 S.W.2d 732, 734 (1952); Booker v. Smith, 214
Ark. 102, 108, 214 S.W.2d 513, 515 (1948). See also Annotation, Change of Denominational
Relations or Fundamental Doctrines by Majority Faction of Independent or Congregational
Church as Ground for Award of Property to Minority, 15 A.L.R.3d 29 (1967).
82. Rush v. Yancey, 233 Ark. 883, 884, 349 S.W.2d 337, 339 (1961); Ables, 220 Ark. at
220, 246 S.W.2d at 734; Booker, 214 Ark. at 108, 214 S.W.2d at 515.
83. 96 Ark. 117, 131 S.W. 49.
84. Id. at 120-22, 131 S.W. at 50.
85. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-28-218 (1987).
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which prohibited examination of church records as specified in that
statute.
The first amendment's free exercise clause is clearly implicated
when religious beliefs and practices oppose the mandates of secular
law. A court must give strict scrutiny to the purpose of the civil law
and find a "compelling" state interest before requiring compliance in
contravention of religious beliefs.8 6 If the court concludes that the
state interest sufficiently outweighs the right to free exercise of reli-
gion without government interference, it may compel the religious or-
ganization to comply with the law.17 For example, the United States
Supreme Court ruled in Reynolds v. United States"8 that a Mormon
cannot have more than one wife, regardless of the teaching of his
church. The Court recognized that to allow all religiously-founded
behavior would "in effect . . .permit every citizen to become a law
unto himself." 9
However, a Seventh-Day Adventist whose religion prohibits
work on Saturday cannot be denied unemployment benefits for refusal
to accept a job which requires it.9° Nor can the state prohibit Amish
parents from educating their children at home9 or require any indi-
vidual to declare his belief in God as a prerequisite for holding public
office. 92
Arkansas cases applying this "balancing test" are few, and the
scales have tipped heavily in favor of the government interest. In
Cude v. State93 a father refused to allow his children to be vaccinated
against smallpox. 94 The court held that the state interest in protecting
public health and safety mandated administration of the vaccine
86. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). "[O]nly the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation." Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
87. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (Court balanced state interest in pre-
serving public peace with Jehovah's Witnesses' right to solicit contributions).
88. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
89. Id. at 167. The following analogy prefaced this conclusion:
Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious wor-
ship, would it be seriously contended that the civil government under which he lived
could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Or if a wife religiously believed it was her
duty to burn herself upon the funeral pile of her dead husband, would it be beyond
the power of the civil government to prevent her carrying her belief into practice?
Id. at 166.
90. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
91. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
92. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
93. 237 Ark. 927, 377 S.W.2d 816 (1964).
94. Id. State Department of Education regulations required the vaccination before chil-
dren could attend school. Id.
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notwithstanding the religious beliefs of the parent. 9"
Similarly, in Burrow v. State9 6 the court held that compliance
with the state's mandatory school attendance statute did not infringe
upon a parent's first amendment rights.97 Burrow contended that his
religious beliefs9" demanded education of his children at home. The
court rejected this argument, distinguishing the case from the "excep-
tional considerations" of Wisconsin v. Yoder 99 and concluding that on
balance the state's interest in seeing that its children received proper
education outweighed the plaintiff's right to free exercise of
religion, ioo
In Abram v. City ofFayetteville ' the court implicitly balanced a
city's interest in zoning ordinance enforcement against a church's
right to operate a parochial school in violation of those laws. The
court distinguished between "an infringement upon a religious belief,
which is absolutely prohibited, and a limitation upon a religious ac-
tion, which is subject to reasonable laws designed to protect the public
health or welfare," 102 and held that requiring church compliance with
the ordinance was not prohibited under the first amendment. 0 3
The provision of the Arkansas Non-Profit Corporation Act re-
quiring disclosure of records"° provoked the religious freedom ques-
tion in Gipson. Although litigation entailing a church's status as a
non-profit corporation is not uncommon, °5 the statute plays no part
in any prior Arkansas cases. Few cases from other jurisdictions in
which incorporation is relevant involve the issue of statutorily-di-
rected disclosure of records.
When a church corporation is acting in a business capacity,
95. Id. at 934, 377 S.W.2d at 819. Cude was cited in a similar ruling in Wright v. DeWitt
School Dist. No. 1, 238 Ark. 906, 908, 385 S.W.2d 644, 646 (1965).
96. 282 Ark. 479, 669 S.W.2d 441 (1984).
97. Id. at 482, 669 S.W.2d at 442.
98. Burrows' beliefs apparently were not held pursuant to the doctrine or teachings of any
organized church or traditional religious faith. While the court did not question his sincerity,
the lack of orthodox authority for these beliefs was implicitly relevant to its decision.
99. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The Burrow court distinguished Yoder because that case in-
volved Amish parents who were concerned about the effects of organized education on three
centuries of religious beliefs. The appellant in Burrow made no comparable showing. 282 Ark.
at 482, 669 S.W.2d at 442.
100. Arkansas law now allows parents to educate their children at home, pursuant to the
provisions of ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-15-501 to 507 (1987).
101. 281 Ark. 63, 661 S.W.2d 371 (1983).
102. Id. at 65, 661 SoW.2d at 372.
103. Id.
104. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-28-218 (1987).
105. See infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
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courts find no constitutional conflict in requiring compliance with
state corporation statutes. 10 6 Moreover, courts usually have no prob-
lem exercising jurisdiction over a suit by members of an incorporated
church which asks for relief by way of an injunction or accounting
pursuant to state law.' 0 7  While such actions are similar to that
brought by the Gipson plaintiffs, those cases generally present no
questions of religious doctrine and the defendants assert no first
amendment rights when refusing to comply with the statute. The
opinions from Louisiana courts considered by the Arkansas court in
Gipson I,"08 both of which involved suits for accounting, election of
directors, and divulgence of church records, address the constitu-
tional question of forced compliance with state corporation statutes.
However, in those cases the courts concluded that the first amend-
ment issue was not a pertinent factor, for no questions of religious
doctrine were present. 0 9
Two California cases which involved production of church
records provide a somewhat different set of facts. Worldwide Church
of God, Inc. v. California 1 ' involved an action by the state attorney
general rather than a suit by church members. Pursuant to authority
granted by state law, the attorney general instituted procedures seek-
ing an accounting of the church's finances and a request that it be
placed in receivership."I  The state alleged that the organization's
funds were being diverted for private purposes." 2 The Church of
God resisted court-ordered discovery requests and countered with a
106. See, e.g., Free for All Missionary Baptist Church v. Southeastern Beverage and Ice
Equip., 135 Ga. App. 498, 218 S.E.2d 169 (1975) (church attempt to rescind rental agreement
for use of liquor dispensing equipment unsuccessful); Crest Chimney Cleaning Co. v. Ahi Ezer
Congregation, 62 Misc. 2d 1040, 310 N.Y.S.2d 217 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970) (congregation incor-
porated under state religious corporation law could not avoid paying for labor and materials
for work done on rental property).
107. See, e.g., Hollins v. Edmonds, 616 S.W.2d 801 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (church members
could maintain action for an accounting and election of directors of church corporation under
state statute); Thomas v. Craig, 424 So. 2d 1090 (La. App. 1982) (suit to enjoin, inter alia,
actions of pastor prohibited by state incorporation laws was within court's jurisdiction); Miller
v. McClung, 4 Mich. App. 714, 145 N.W.2d 473 (1966) (church members who protested sale
of property by church leadership allowed to maintain civil action for injunction and account-
ing pursuant to corporate status of church).
108. 288 Ark. 422, 427-29, 706 S.W.2d 369, 372-73 (1986).
109. Bourgeois v. Landrum, 396 So. 2d 1275, 1277-78 (La. 1981); Wilkerson v. Battiste,
393 So. 2d 195, 197 (La. App. 1980).
110. 623 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1980).
Ill. Id. at 614.
112. Id.
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civil rights suit" 3 in federal court, charging that state supervision of a
religious institution was unconstitutional. The Ninth Circuit declined
to rule on the constitutionality of the California Corporations Code
provision under which the action against the church had been filed,
but indicated that investigation of fraud in a charitable institution was
"a state interest similar to the magnitude of controlling state welfare
fraud."' '4 This interest pointed to the conclusion that "[it] is unques-
tioned that the state attorney general may constitutionally investigate
and supervise the affairs of some charitable corporations. ' ...
In Church of Hakeem, Inc. v. Superior Court 16 members of a
religious organization sought disclosure of the church membership
list in conjunction with an action involving allegations of fraud and
breach of fiduciary duty.' ' Church leadership resisted on constitu-
tional grounds, contending that release of the members' names vio-
lated the right of associational privacy. I18 The court agreed, finding
that no compelling state interest required the church to comply with a
discovery request for a list of its members.' The case was distin-
guished from those in which the very nature of the Ku Klux Klan and
the Communist party warranted production of their membership
lists. 120
This exploration into the legal precedent of the issues presented
by Gipson would not be complete without mention of the Oklahoma
Supreme Court's recent decision in a case which received nationwide
publicity. Guinn v. The Church of Christ of Collinsville 121 concerned
an action by a former parishioner against the church and its leader-
ship for invasion of privacy. The plaintiff had been publicly chastised
before the congregation for having a sexual relationship outside mar-
riage.122 Evidence at trial established that belief in the propriety of
113. The church filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which prohibits deprivation of
constitutional rights under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
114. 623 F.2d at 616.
115. Id. The church's civil rights suit and request for an injunction was maintainable only
if they alleged bad faith on the part of the state, and the case was therefore remanded to allow
amendment of its complaint. Id.
116. 110 Cal. App. 3d 384, 168 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1980).
117. The plaintiffs wanted the list to support their contention that others had similar com-
plaints and that therefore the case should proceed as a class action. Id. at 390, 168 Cal. Rptr.
at 16.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 389, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 16 (citing Communist Party v. Control Board, 367 U.S. 1
(1961) and Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928)).
121. 775 P.2d 766 (Okla. 1989).
122. Id. at 767-69.
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such an open admonition was based on the church's interpretation of
the New Testament, and that the plaintiff was aware of this facet of
church doctrine when she became a member. 123 It was also estab-
lished that the plaintiff's suit was not rooted in any dispute with the
church over matters of biblical interpretation. Instead, her claim was
founded on the premise that, religious beliefs notwithstanding, the
church's disciplinary measures amounted to tortious conduct. 124 The
Oklahoma court overturned a jury verdict for the plaintiff on consti-
tutional grounds. 12 5 Reasoning that she had become a member of the
congregation fully aware of the challenged practice, the court decided
that the free exercise clause of the first amendment prohibited a court
determination of the accuracy of the church's biblical authority for
that practice. The court concluded that to allow recovery of damages
in such a case would constitute state interference with religious be-
liefs. 126 The decision was expressly based on a balancing of the state's
interest in enforcing common law tort principles of defamation with
the right of the church to discipline a wayward member according to
what it believed was a biblical mandate.' 27 The analysis found free
exercise of religion to be paramount, for the church's actions in that
case did not pose a substantial "threat to 'public safety, peace or
order.' "128
III.
The Arkansas Supreme Court explicitly separated the entangle-
ment issue from the free exercise issue in the Gipson opinions. In Gip-
son I the court considered whether the church elders' refusal to
comply with the Non-Profit Corporation Act deserved first amend-
ment protection. 129 While citing Louisiana decisions which allowed
church members to inspect church records under a similar statute ,
30
the court recognized the potential for an unconstitutional inquiry into
123. Id. at 774.
124. Id. at 777-78.
125. Id. at 785-86.
126. Id. at 769-73.
127. Id. at 773-75.
128. Id. at 771 n.16 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963)). The Oklahoma
court's opinion in Guinn contains a thorough analysis of Supreme Court precedent on both
intrachurch disputes and the "free exercise" of religion issue.
129. 288 Ark. 422, 427-29, 706 S.W.2d 369, 372-73 (1986).
130. Id. at 427-29, 706 S.W.2d at 373 (citing Bourgeois v. Landrum, 396 So. 2d 1275 (La.
1981) and Wilkerson v. Batiste, 393 So. 2d 195 (La. App. 1980)).
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church doctrine.' 31 However, the court was unable to ascertain from
the record before it whether forced compliance with the statute would
be a violation of the church's right to free exercise of religion. The
case was therefore remanded to the chancellor for an evidentiary
hearing on that issue.'32
The Gipson II opinion expressed strong disapproval of the trial
court's referral of a case such as this to a special master.'33 Such
referral was not warranted "by reason of anticipation of a lengthy
trial, complexity of the issues and congestion of the court's calen-
dar."'134  Citing Rule 53(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 1 35 the court declared that routine reference to a master was
acceptable only in "matters of accounting and difficult computation of
damages," and otherwise only "upon a showing that some exceptional
condition requires it."136 Declaring that the improper use of a master
without such a showing was itself grounds for dismissing the present
appeal, the court instead concluded that de novo review of the case
was appropriate' 37 in the interests of bringing this protracted litiga-
tion to an end. 138
The court then examined the United States Supreme Court deci-
sions on intrachurch disputes, first citing Watson v. Jones 13' as au-
thority for the premise that civil court involvement in church matters
which requires an inquiry into religious law and custom "deprives
these bodies of the right to interpret their own church laws and opens
131. Id. at 428, 706 S.W.2d at 373. "Here appellants assert the very entanglement in ques-
tions of religious doctrine that the court found absent in the Louisiana cases." Id.
132. Id.
133. 295 Ark. 371, 375-76, 749 S.W.2d 297, 299 (1988).
134. Id. (citing State v. Nelson, 246 Ark. 210, 438 S.W.2d 33 (1969)).
135. Rule 53(b) provides in pertinent part:
A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule. Reference shall be
made in only those cases where there is no right to trial by jury or where such right
has been waived. Except in matters of account and difficult computation of damages,
a reference shall be made only upon a showing that some exceptional condition re-
quires it.
ARK. R. Civ. P. 53(b).
136. 295 Ark. at 376, 749 S.W.2d at 299.
137. Id. The court stated that "this court generally reviews matters appealed from chan-
cery court on a de novo basis." Id. at 374, 749 S.W.2d at 298 (citing Lynch v. Brunner, 294
Ark. 515, 745 S.W.2d 115 (1988)). See also Potter v. Easley, 288 Ark. 133, 703 S.W.2d 442
(1986); City of Little Rock v. Cash, 277 Ark. 494, 664 S.W.2d 229 (1982), cert. denied, 462
U.S. 1111 (1982); Ferguson v. Green, 266 Ark. 556, 587 S.W.2d 18 (1979).
138. The original complaint in the case was filed almost four years earlier on November 2,
1984. See supra note 3.
139. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
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the door to all sorts of evils."'' Gonzalez,'4 t Milivojevich,'4 2 and
Wolf' 3 were included as support for the deference approach:
"[w]hen religious organizations establish rules for their internal gov-
ernance, and tribunals for adjudicating disputes over such matters,
the constitution requires that civil courts accept their decisions as
binding on them.""' The court clearly believed that "neutral princi-
ples of law" could not be applied to effect a resolution of the dispute
in Gipson:
Here, the underlying dispute between the appellee members and
the elders is of a long-standing, ongoing, heated nature E 451 ex-
tending beyond application of our code provisions to an explicit
attempt by appellees to convince the church membership that they
have a biblically based right to access the records of the church and
to determine who the elders of the church will be.' 4 6
After concluding that the controversy in Gipson was essentially
religious in nature, the court summarized the beliefs of the elders as to
their God-given responsibility to manage all affairs of the congrega-
tion.147 Consideration of those beliefs dictated a decision that "appli-
140. 295 Ark. at 376, 749 S.W.2d at 299.
141. 280 U.S. 1 (1929). See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
142. 426 U.S. 696 (1976). See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
143. 443 U.S. 595 (1979). See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
144. 295 Ark. at 376-77, 749 S.W.2d at 300 (citing Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979)).
145. The case received extensive press coverage throughout the course of the litigation.
See, e.g., Members Press Efforts to See Church Records, The Ark. Gazette, May 28, 1988, at
6C, col. 5; Dissolve Legal Entity, Elder Says, The Ark. Gazette, Mar. 18, 1987, at IB, col. 1;
Their Salaries, Church Financial Data Told to Members, The Ark. Gazette, Dec. 17, 1986, at
11A, col. 1; Lawyer Says He Sought Payment From Church Elders for 'Damages,' The Ark.
Gazette, Nov. 26, 1986, at 16A, col. 1; Church Member Files Suit, Alleges Elders Abusing
Power, The Ark. Gazette, Jan. 6, 1985, at IA, col. 3. Gazette coverage over the four years of
the suit totalled nineteen articles. One article included a photograph of plaintiff Bob Scott
physically attacking defendant and church pastor John Gipson. Id., Jan. 6, 1985, at IA.
146. 295 Ark. at 377, 749 S.W.2d at 300. The Church of Christ has no written tenets of
belief, basing its doctrine solely on its interpretation of the New Testament. See Guinn v.
Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766. It is evident from the pleadings and exhibits
filed by both parties that this case involved a dispute over that interpretation. See, e.g., Plain-
tiffs' Affidavits, July 14, 1986, and July 15, 1986; Defendant's Responses to Interrogatories,
July 3, 1986. Gipson v. Brown (No. 84-4657).
147. 295 Ark. at 378, 749 S.W.2d at 300-01.
We find that the record reveals substantial evidence to the effect that the elders' claim
of an exemption is in fact tied to established doctrine within the church: (1) the New
Testament places within the hands of a select group of elders the sole responsibility
for overseeing the affairs of the church and its congregation; (2) the scriptural duty
extends .to all aspects of administration within the church with the elders being ac-
countable to God for the execution of their responsibility in a manner consistent with
the Bible; (3) the scriptural purpose behind the doctrine is that there be harmony and
unity within the flock; and (4) the execution of the responsibility is a matter left to
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cation of our state corporation laws would almost certainly infringe
upon the doctrine of the Church."' 148
With this issue decided, the court applied the requisite balancing
test. Beginning with a threshold determination that the evidence
showed the elders' disinclination to comply with certain statutory re-
quirements was in fact based on firmly held religious beliefs, the court
then weighed the church's right to free exercise of those beliefs against
the state's interest in enforcing the disclosure provision of the Non-
Profit Corporation Act. 49 Citing Wisconsin v. Yoder 15° and Sherbert
v. Verner,I"' the court declared that there must be "a state interest of
sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under
the free exercise clause."' 52 The court found no evidence of a compel-
ling state interest which would outweigh the right of the Sixth and
Izard Church of Christ to operate according to its doctrine, practice,
and polity. The conclusion that the state's interest in disclosure was
insignificant rested on a conviction that the entire matter was predi-
cated on an intrachurch dispute: "[in] light of the extent to which the
facts before us implicate purely ecclesiastical concerns, the appeal
should be dismissed."'
1 53
Justice Purtle filed a vigorous dissent in both Gipson II 4 and
Gipson IM. 'I The basic theme underlying his objection to the major-
ity's decision is that once the Sixth and Izard Church of Christ chose
to avail itself of the state's incorporation laws, it could not then refuse
to comply with the statute under the "pretext of religious
freedom." 156
the scripturally guided discretion of the elders as evidenced by biblical admonitions
to the flock to obey and submit to them that have the rule over the flock.
Id.
148. Id. at 378, 749 S.W.2d at 301.
149. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-28-218 (1987).
150. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
151. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
152. 295 Ark. at 378, 749 S.W.2d at 301 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214
(1972) and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
153. Id. As a codicil the court concluded with a reference to its statement in Gipson I that
this case must be distinguished from the Louisiana decision in Bourgeois v. Landrum, 396 So.
2d 1275 (1981), because the latter involved no questions of entanglement in religious doctrine.
154. 295 Ark. at 379-85, 749 S.W.2d at 301-04 (Purtle, J., dissenting, joined by Dudley and
Newbern, J.J.).
155. 296 Ark. 160, 161-65, 752 S.W.2d 752, 753-55 [hereinafter Gipson III]. Justice Purtle
did not participate in the Gipson I decision. 288 Ark. 422, 432, 706 S.W.2d 369, 375.
156. Gipson II, 295 Ark. at 381, 749 S.W.2d at 302-03; Gipson III, 296 Ark. at 164-65, 752
S.W.2d at 754. Apparently the church incorporation was motivated by the desire to avoid the
possibility of personal liability on the part of the elders for promissory notes they signed in
conjunction with financing church construction. Supplemental Abstract and Brief for Appel-
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In Gipson II Justice Purtle argued that the court should have
ordered church compliance because the United States Supreme Court
has "recognized that under some circumstances civil court review of
ecclesiastical actions is appropriate."' 57 He found the Bourgeois deci-
sion indistinguishable from the facts of Gipson and saw no constitu-
tional problems in requiring the elders in this case, as had the
Louisiana court in Bourgeois, to produce the church records as re-
quested. Purtle's discussion of the first amendment question focused
not on the conflict between the church doctrine and the Non-Profit
Corporation Act, however, but on the issue of the constitutionality of
the statute itself: "the statute providing for incorporation is com-
pletely void of any reference to religion." 158
Justice Purtle's opinion in Gipson III emphatically rejected the
majority's resolution of the case,'5 9 which he characterized as "an ef-
fort to mollycoddle the dominant faction in this church dispute."'"
Purtle believed that the dispute had nothing to do with church doc-
trine, and stated his view that "[t]he church in this case is using this
court to settle its internal bickering."'' 6'
Although reference is again made to the validity of the Non-
Profit Corporation Act,' 6' his dissent concentrated on a review of the
history of the case. Justice Purtle expressed concern over the plain-
tiffs' allegations that church funds were being mishandled and con-
cluded that the court should have affirmed the chancellor's decree
ordering disclosure of church records. 63 Purtle also zeroed in on the
majority's language in Gipson II which dismissed the "appeal," agree-
ing with the plaintiffs' position that the chancellor's order was effec-
tive and that the church elders should therefore be held in
lants at 20, Sept. 3, 1985, Gipson v. Brown (No. 85-180). The majority believed incorporation
was in reality only a vehicle for gaining access to church records. Gipson II, 295 Ark. at 377,
749 S.W.2d at 300.
157. Id. at 383, 749 S.W.2d at 303. Justice Purtle did not mention, however, that in each
of the particular cases he cited the Supreme Court ruled that civil court adjudication of the
dispute had been inappropriate. See supra notes 21-44 and accompanying text.
158. Id. at 384, 749 S.W.2d at 304.
159. 296 Ark. at 161, 752 S.W.2d at 753. Justice Purtle began his dissent with the state-
ment that "[t]he Arkansas civil justice system has suffered damage from which it may never
recover..." and continued, "[flrom this date forward there is no longer a separation of church
and state." Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 162, 752 S.W.2d at 754.
162. Id. Purtle continually argued the constitutionality of the Non-Profit Corporation Act,
which was never an issue in the case.
163. Id. at 163-64, 752 S.W.2d at 755. Contrary to Purtle's assertions, the plaintiffs in this
case did not include fraud as an element of their cause of action. Complaint, Gipson v. Brown,
288 Ark. 422, 706 S.W.2d 369 (1986) (No. 84-4657).
[Vol. 12:75
DISCLOSURE OF CHURCH RECORDS
contempt.' 64 He did not, however, address theper curiam's quotation
of the mandate issued pursuant to the majority opinion in Gipson II,
which clearly dismissed the case.' 65
IV.
At first blush the Gipson decisions appear to be an example of the
"rubber-stamped" establishment of religion to which Justice Rehn-
quist referred in his Milivojevich 166 dissent. However, careful scrutiny
of the Arkansas Supreme Court's opinions in this case reveals that,
despite reliance on cases involving intrachurch disputes and allusions
to the deference principle, the intrachurch dispute in Gipson was only
one factor in the court's determination that enforcement of the Non-
Profit Corporation Act was prohibited as a violation of the first
amendment.
The opinions in Gipson I and Gipson II must be analyzed consec-
utively in order to fully understand the Arkansas court's disposition
of the case. The court began its analysis by following the approach
taken by the Supreme Court in Jones v. Wolf 16 7 In Gipson I the court
was concerned only with the threshold question of whether or not
judicial involvement in the dispute between the members of the Sixth
and Izard Church of Christ was a violation of the first amendment.
Remand of the case was ordered to effect this determination. The
court at this point would agree to application of neutral principles of
law if the evidentiary hearing revealed that no doctrinal issue was in-
volved. The subsequent reversal of the chancellor in Gipson II was
predicated upon the court's conclusion that the special master uncon-
stitutionally applied the "neutral" law relevant to this case-the Ar-
kansas Non-Profit Corporation Act.
The nonjusticiability of the intrachurch dispute was relevant to
the decision only because the lower court found that the dispute was
doctrinal in nature, and that the doctrine in question, the authority of
the elders, was the basis for refusal to comply with the statutory dis-
closure requirement. The determination that noncompliance with the
law was rooted in religious beliefs required the court to apply the bal-
ancing test.
164. Id.
165. 296 Ark. at 161, 752 S.W.2d at 753. "It is therefore considered by the Court that the
decree of said Chancery Court in this cause rendered be and the same is hereby dismissed in
accordance with the opinion herein delivered." Id.
166. 426 U.S. 696, 734 (1976).
167. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
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It is at this juncture that Justice Purtle and the majority came to
a parting of the ways. Purtle never reached the balancing test because
he rejected the free exercise issue at the outset, believing the elders'
assertion of religious beliefs to be a "pretext" for avoiding compliance
with the law.168 Purtle's posture on this matter points squarely down
the path of "neutral principles" toward a conclusion that the church
should have been forced to comply with the statute. He rejected the
elders' claim that their refusal to obey the statute was based on bibli-
cal, and thus church, doctrine. Application of "neutral principles"-
the statute-was therefore permitted under Jones v. Wolf. 1 6 9 How-
ever, once credence is given to the elders' beliefs, the free exercise
issue is inescapable and application of the balancing test is required.
Upon recognition of the elders' free exercise right, the court, perhaps
unwittingly but nevertheless unmistakably, settled the doctrinal
dispute.
In judging any claim of "free exercise," a court must of necessity
attempt to ascertain the sincerity of the religious belief in question.
The majority of the Arkansas Supreme Court accepted the evidence
presented by the elders of the Sixth and Izard Church of Christ,
which showed that disclosure of their records would violate church
doctrine. Justice Purtle's dissents are rooted in what is obviously a
doubt about this sincerity and in an acceptance of the findings of the
special master. The majority's unwillingness to accept the master's
findings was likely based in part on its explicit rejection of that man-
ner of dealing with the issue by the chancery court.
Contrary to the echoes of impending doom which ring through
Justice Purtle's dissents, the majority opinions in the Gipson cases do
not warrant predictions of the collapse of the separation of church
and state in Arkansas. At no point does the court indicate that claims
of religious freedom automatically place a litigant "above the law," or
that courts should mechanically apply the deference principle to in-
trachurch disputes without thoroughly examining its applicability to a
particular set of facts. What is clear, and what is most significant
about this case, is that the court will require a clear showing of com-
pelling state interest by those who seek to deny claims to the right to
free exercise of religion. The majority emphasizes that the plaintiffs in
this case made no such showing, and the "pox on both your houses"
attitude of its cursory opinion in Gipson III indicates a degree of im-
patience with a controversy that the court believed was not a proper
168. See supra notes 165-71.
169. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
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subject for litigation. A more likely prediction is that Gipson will be
limited to its facts. What is perhaps also significant about this case is
the underlying message it sends to religious organizations of this state:
Benefits of incorporation must be weighed against the potential of be-
ing embroiled in a civil dispute which a court will ultimately refuse to
settle.
Tonia Peoples Jones

